The new contract deployment restores the `bytecode hash -> bytecode` entry in the internal state.Ĭosign is a container signing and verification utility. with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered. If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e.
MILKYTRACKER DOC PATCH
The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint, so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required. This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint version v0.18.0. However, due to a bug in the `DeleteAccount`function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same `CodeHash`) will also stop working once one contract invokes `selfdestruct`, even though the other contracts did not invoke the `selfdestruct` OPCODE. In Ethermint running versions before `v0.17.2`, the contract `selfdestruct` invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. Users who are unable to upgrade should do the following if applicable: - Remove `allowExtendedProperties: true` DataSource setting - Add `allowExtendedProperties: false` DataSource setting - When passing directly to the connector functions, manually sanitize the user input for the `contains` LoopBack filter beforehand.Įthermint is an Ethereum library. This affects users who does any of the following: - Connect to the database via the DataSource with `allowExtendedProperties: true` setting OR - Uses the connector's CRUD methods directly OR - Uses the connector's other methods to interpret the LoopBack filter. When the extended filter property `contains` is permitted to be interpreted by the Postgres connector, it is possible to inject arbitrary SQL which may affect the confidentiality and integrity of data stored on the connected database. Improper input validation on the `contains` LoopBack filter may allow for arbitrary SQL injection. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL.
If a user specifies a URL such as `` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require("undici") undici.request() ``` Instead of processing the request as `` (or `` when ` is used`), it actually processes the request as `` and sends it to ``. Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`.
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